Unauthenticated plugin management and directory deletion in Instant Update CMS

Several administration pages in Instant Update CMS don't check that the visitor is logged in. Anyone on the internet can install, enable, disable and remove plugins. Removing a plugin deletes a folder whose name the attacker controls.

Severity9.1Critical
CVERequested from MITRE
AffectedAll versions (archived)
FixNone: restrict or migrate
Published
November 16, 2026
Product
Instant Update CMS (InstantUpdate/CMS)
Affected versions
All versions, up to and including the final commit 5e70496 (2018). The repository is archived.
Weakness
CWE-862
CVSS 3.1
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
Credit
Jason Sager

Who is affected

Any site running Instant Update CMS with /administration/ reachable over the web. The repository has been archived since 2018, so no fix is coming. This is a different issue from CVE-2018-1000501 (password recovery).

What goes wrong

The CMS has no central login check. Its shared admin base class (CS_Controller) loads the user if one is logged in, but doesn't block anyone who isn't. Each admin page therefore has to check for an administrator itself, and three don't:

  • administration/plugins: no check. This page installs, enables, disables and removes plugins.
  • administration/extend: no check.
  • administration/images: the check is present but commented out.

Removing a plugin recursively deletes iu-resources/plugins/<name>, using a name taken straight from the web address.

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker can change which plugins are installed and active, and can delete folders on the server. Depending on the plugins available, installing or enabling a plugin may also lead to code execution.

What to do

  1. Migrate away from Instant Update CMS. It is unmaintained.
  2. Until then, restrict /administration/ to trusted IP addresses, or put it behind web-server authentication.
  3. Review your web server logs for requests to /administration/plugins, /administration/extend and /administration/images from unexpected addresses.

Disclosure timeline

DateEvent
2026-11-16Found and confirmed in Gantrel's isolated lab.
2026-11-16Repository archived. No maintainer or security contact available.
2026-11-16CVE requested from MITRE (CNA of last resort). Advisory published.

References

Questions about this advisory: [email protected].

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